

PERSUASION THROUGH EMOTIONS IN ATHENIAN DELIBERATIVE ORATORY

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Introduction and rhetorical theory

Aristotle states in the *Rhetoric* – the most comprehensive surviving rhetorical treatise from Classical Greece – that there are three modes of persuasion: logical reasoning (*logos*), arguments from character (*êthos*), and ‘putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind’ (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a1-4: ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς), which he confirms shortly after (1356a14-15) means by emotion (*pathos*). He later tells us that when people change in respect of their emotions, they change their judgments (2.1, 1378a19-20: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις).¹ He goes on (*Rh.* 2.2-11) to discuss a somewhat idiosyncratic list of emotions that can usefully be aroused in oratory. These include anger (*orgê*) and calming down (*praînsis*), friendship (*philia*) and hatred (*misos*), fear (*phobos*) and confidence (*tharsos*), shame (*aischunê*) and shamelessness (*anaischuntia*), gratitude (*charin echein*) and ingratitude (*acharistein*),² pity (*eleos*), indignation (*nemesan*), envy (*phthonos*), emulation (*zêlos*) and scorn (*kataphronêsis*),³ and a number of minor described but unnamed emotions.

Aristotle famously divides speeches into three types – forensic (courtroom), deliberative (e.g. Assembly/Council), and epideictic (display) – but he does not give any explicit advice as to which emotions are most appropriate for each type of speech. His near contemporary Anaximenes, in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*,⁴ is more helpful. In a chapter dealing with forensic oratory, he says that six emotions are particularly pertinent: three friendly emotions (pity, gratitude and goodwill – the last similar to Aristotle’s friendship) for ourselves, and three hostile emotions (hatred, anger and envy) for our opponent (*Rh. Al.* 36, 1444b35-45a18).⁵ This is reasonable: trials concern what people have done in the past; anger and gratitude are aroused by

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¹ The sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, in his *Encomium to Helen*, agrees: ‘Speech is a powerful lord that ... can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity’ (8); ‘The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion’ (14); tr. Kennedy (2007) 253-4.

² Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156-68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (*charis*) and unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128. Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with gratitude.

³ I prefer scorn to the usual contempt, which I think is a mistranslation here. Aristotle describes contempt elsewhere, when he says *kataphronêsis* is treating someone as if they are of no account (2.2, 1378b14-17). Here it means a disdainful desire not to be, or have something, like someone else (*Rh.* 2.11, 1388b22-8) – hence contrary to emulation. English scorn covers both (contemptuous and disdainful) senses of *kataphronêsis*. The contemptuous version will appear below (main text). On different emotion scripts included within one word, see Kaster (2005) and Sanders (2014).

⁴ This treatise is contained within the Aristotelian corpus. Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is long-standing and probable, though the author’s identity is irrelevant to my argument.

⁵ Note that Anaximenes uses *eu diatithenai* for goodwill here – and elsewhere *eumeneia* (36, 1441b36-42a7) and *philia* (34, 1439b17) as well as *eunoia* (29, 1436b16-37). *Eunoia* is the term regularly used in the Attic corpus to request goodwill. I discuss Anaximenes’ goodwill (various terms) and its relationship to Aristotle’s *philia* in Sanders (forthcoming). For both Anaximenes’ and Aristotle’s lists of emotions, cf. Winter (this volume).

specific past actions, while the other four emotions respond to present impressions created by past actions. A large amount of scholarship has been published on these emotions in Attic oratory, and the evidence cited is overwhelmingly – usually entirely – from forensic speeches.⁶

Accordingly, it is a useful shorthand to consider these six as ‘forensic emotions’, and I refer to them as such below. This does not mean that they are the only emotions aroused in forensic oratory, or that they do not appear in other forms of oratory; rather, that they are the six emotions most commonly associated with judging. Cases in the Athenian lawcourts were sometimes quasi-deliberative, when the lawcourt substituted for the Assembly (e.g. the various Lysias speeches concerned with upholding the post-403 amnesty, or Demosthenes’ attempt to overturn Leptines’ law in *Against Leptines*), and in these cases other, ‘deliberative emotions’ could come into play as well.

So what are the emotions most associated with deliberation? Here Anaximenes is less helpful.⁷ In his chapter dealing with deliberative oratory, he discusses the same six emotions as he does for forensic oratory (*Rh. Al.* 34, 1439b15-17). This is not completely wrong: just as some forensic speeches also have a quasi-deliberative function, some deliberative speeches have a quasi-forensic one – for instance in Thucydides, Sthenelaidas’ angry speech urging Sparta to war to punish Athenian aggression (1.86), or Cleon’s speech arousing anger and seeking punishment for Mytilene for rebelling (3.37-40).⁸ Some Thucydidean speeches completely blur the boundaries between the two types of oratory – e.g. at Plataea’s ‘trial’ by Spartan generals, which has both political and judicial implications, the Plataeans attempt to arouse pity (3.53-9), and the Thebans attempt to quash it and arouse anger in its place (3.61-7). In the Plataean speech (and elsewhere) there are also occasions when a speaker says his listeners should aid a city because they were aided by them in the past – deliberative policy informed by gratitude or goodwill.⁹ However, these are relatively uncommon examples, which do not account for most of the emotional arguments of the large majority of deliberative speeches, whether in Thucydides or in the Attic corpus.

Returning to Aristotle, and reading between his lines, we find that we *can* piece together some advice on the emotions appropriate to deliberative oratory. He argues that the three types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative and epideictic) refer to three different time periods, and that deliberative oratory refers to the future (*Rh.* 1.3, 1358a36-b20). This is reasonable, as those deliberating and taking decisions will aim to affect future events. Accordingly, I believe

⁶ e.g. Johnstone (1999) 109-25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212-31 on gratitude; Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Bers (2009) 77-98 on pity; Sanders (2012) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and pity; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. Carey (1996) devotes half a page (406) to emotional arguments in deliberative oratory (in both the Attic corpus and Thucydides), following a longer discussion of forensic speeches. Konstan (2010) on rhetoric and emotion mostly discusses rhetoricians, the few examples from actual speeches all being forensic.

⁷ As are modern scholars – see previous note. Hesk (2009) 147-50 and Usher (2010) on deliberative oratory, and Fox and Livingston (2010) on rhetoric and historiography, barely mention emotions. Hunt (2010), on deliberative debate in Demosthenes’ period, sometimes states that arguments – e.g. involving familial relations (108), the state being at risk (139), or farms being burned (141-2) – would have been emotionally laden; occasionally he identifies specific emotions – e.g. that Athenians would feel shame and outrage at being compared to slaves (115), or shame and anger at those who threatened their womenfolk (147-8). Debnar (2001), on Thucydidean speeches to Spartan audiences, occasionally mentions specific emotions but without elaboration, e.g.: ‘there is evidence enough in Sthenelaidas’ speech of the role that passions played in bringing about the war. He deftly appeals to Spartan pride as well as to the fear of growing Athenian power’ (76). Pelling (2012) 289-96 also briefly discusses some emotions (mainly pity) in some Thucydidean speeches.

⁸ On Cleon’s quasi-forensic argumentation throughout this speech, see Fulkerson (2008) and Harris (2013) 97-104.

⁹ On goodwill in Greek interstate relations, see Mitchell (1997) and Low (2007) 51-3, 155.

Aristotle is indirectly counselling that we should expect emotions that are directed towards the future to be most suitable to this sort of oratory.

We have already seen that the six ‘forensic emotions’ refer either to past actions or present impressions arising from past actions. If we look at Aristotle’s definitions of other emotions, we find that several of them do appear to be future-directed. Fear, he tells us, relates to some destructive or painful future evil (*Rh.* 2.5, 1382a21-2: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ). Confidence is also future-directed, being hope with imagination (2.5, 1383a16-19: τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ <φόβῳ..., ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγυὲς ὄντων).¹⁰ These emotions should therefore be particularly applicable to deliberative speeches. Shame – a concern about falling into disrepute – relates to things present, past and future (2.6, 1383b12-14: ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων), and so should apply to all three types of speech. Aristotle does not discuss pride – one of his more obvious omissions – but clearly a concern with our continued good reputation will be as pertinent to deliberative speech as shame.¹¹ These observations by Aristotle all seem reasonable, and lead me to posit fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride as emotions particularly pertinent to deliberative oratory – i.e. the emotions that should principally be aroused in order to persuade those deliberating to choose a particular course of action. So, let us turn to actual deliberative speeches, and see if this is indeed the case.

Deliberative speeches in the Attic oratorical corpus

In the Attic corpus, deliberative speeches overwhelmingly means Demosthenes, but not exclusively,¹² and the fact that we have speeches by several authors will lend stronger weight to my conclusions. We should note that there are sections of all deliberative speeches that do not obviously use emotional arguments at all – they either describe the current political situation, or offer advice, or use other types of rhetorical argument.¹³ Some speeches use emotional arguments very little, while others use them a lot. While I will refer to a range of speeches, I structure my discussion around the three *Olynthiacs*.¹⁴ This is partly because their emotional arguments are particularly detailed, and cover a larger than usual proportion of the speeches. But in addition, the fact that we have three speeches all written by the same author and delivered

¹⁰ While hope and confidence overlap to a large extent in English, such divergence as they have seems to be that hope suggests the strong desirability of a certain outcome, while confidence suggests a strong expectation of that outcome. This distinction may or may not be reflected in ancient Greek, but here at any rate I follow Aristotle in considering them two aspects of the same emotion. As in Aristotle, fear is the opposite of both hope and confidence (as I distinguish them) in English.

¹¹ Orators sometimes explicitly ‘flag’ (i.e. label) the emotions they are trying to arouse, but not always. Some emotions lend themselves to explicit exhortation only in certain circumstances – see e.g. Rubinstein (2004) on anger and hatred; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill. Others do not lend themselves to explicit mention but can only be aroused covertly (i.e. without labelling) – see e.g. Sanders (2014) 79-99 on envy. This is not the place to consider this question at length, but it would appear that fear is less often, confidence and shame more often, ‘flagged’ by the speaker as the emotion sought. (Pride cannot be flagged as it has no label in Classical Greek – though there are many for being arrogantly over-proud.) Where emotions are not ‘flagged’, we must rely on comparing the arguments used with those Arist. *Rh.* 2.2-11 associates with each emotion, and our own common sense.

¹² Dem. 1-10 and 13-17 are deliberative speeches (11 and 12 are letters or tracts, written for publication rather than the Assembly). Dem. 7 is certainly, Dem. 17 almost certainly, and Dem. 13 possibly pseudonymously attributed; Dem. 10’s authenticity was once disputed, but is now generally accepted – see Trevett (2011) 113, 177-8, 224, 287-8; MacDowell (2009) 226-7, 344, 355, 380-1. The only other deliberative speech in the Attic corpus is Andoc. 3.

¹³ Emotional arguments can also interact with other (i.e. *logos* or *êthos*) arguments.

¹⁴ Though I take them out of order, for thematic reasons.

within a short time period in very similar circumstances, strongly suggests that speakers would have had a range of emotional arguments they could choose from, and situations did not necessarily demand one specific emotional response. In these three speeches, we can see Demosthenes almost experimenting with which emotional arguments might have the best effect.

In the *First Olynthiac*, Demosthenes sets the tone early for the emotional response he wants: he says the most especial reason Athenians have for fear (1.3: ὥς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος) is that Philip will wrest from them something of theirs. Philip attacked Olynthus, and the Olynthians now both hate and fear him (1.7: ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι, βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν) – sc. these being the right emotions on incurring Philip's interest. After a long exposition of the current political/military situation, Demosthenes expresses his fears for the future if Philip is allowed to succeed: Athenians should consider what he has done so far; he will gain more and more, while we (Athens) lose more and more; by nature Philip cannot rest on his laurels; he will come closer and closer, right up to Attica (1.12-15). After offering some advice, Demosthenes then arouses confidence or hope that something can be done: he argues that things are not as good for Philip as they seem; he expected a swift victory, but that has not happened; the Thessalians no longer cooperate with him, depriving him of money; he will therefore find it harder and harder to pay his mercenaries; others he has conquered may also be induced to rebel; and he concludes by saying that Philip's difficulty is Athens's opportunity (1.21-4). He then switches back to fear: Athens will have to fight either in Olynthus or here, and Athenians should consider the comparative detriments of fighting in each place; if he comes to Athens, the Thebans will join him; the financial losses of fighting in Attica would be huge, and Attica's farms would be devastated (1.25-7).

Fear turns out to be a particularly common emotion in deliberative speeches. While some speeches in the Demosthenic corpus use very little emotional argumentation, where emotions are aroused we find fear is the most frequent emotion played to. In the *Third Olynthiac* Demosthenes says he has no small fear (3.8: οὐδὲ τὸν φόβον ... μικρὸν ὀρῶ) and then briefly rehashes arguments from the *First Olynthiac* that Thebes hates Athens, while their ally Phocis has no money; if Philip comes to Attica, Athens will be in great danger; and that danger will be on their doorstep, and so great that Athens will have to ask for others' assistance, rather than providing it as they could in Olynthus (3.8-9). In *On the Peace* he arouses fears of all Athens's enemies joining together at once (5.17-19). The *Second Philippic* worries at length about Philip's tendency to continual encroachment (6.20-25). The *pseudo-Demosthenic On Halonnesus* raises the spectre of Macedonia becoming a sea power (7.14-16). And in the *Third Philippic* Demosthenes tries to make his audience feel fear by stressing that the danger is right here, right now; lists the dangers should war break out (9.17-18); and details Philip's military innovations (9.49-51).

Fear arguments are particularly prevalent in *On the Chersonese*. Early in the speech Demosthenes says that doing nothing is not pious, raising a fear of the gods' disapproval, and also not safe; he worries about Athens displaying the same behaviour that caused the present disaster; and he talks of Macedonia's standing army and Philip's pre-planning, in contrast to Athens's continual unreadiness (8.8-12). He says that disbanding the army is against Athens's interests, there are dangers in putting off a decision till later, and they will be forced to surrender the Hellespont to Philip (8.17-18). He argues that all Philip's actions are aimed directly at Athens's democratic constitution, and its power, interests and possessions, which he wants for himself (8.39-45). Most of these arguments are repeated later in the speech, as well as a concern that some Athenian politicians will betray the city to Philip (8.55-63).

Lest one object that the rise of Philip was a uniquely dangerous period and perhaps that is what led to a greater prevalence of fear arguments, a brief look at speeches prior to his rise – or before its effects on Athens became clear – will show that this is not the case. Demosthenes' *On Organisation* arouses fear at Athens losing its allies while it fails to organise (13.7-8), being found militarily unready when eventually it needs to fight (13.11), and at its democracy being undermined (13.14-15). *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* talks of untrustworthy alliances with oligarchs, and oligarchs threatening Athens' democratic constitution (15.18-19). And decades earlier, Andocides' *On the Peace with Sparta* at great length suppresses fear of a risk to the democratic constitution if they make peace (3.1-12), and arouses it at the thought of Persia stepping in militarily should Athens defeat Sparta (3.15), or of losing Athens' strongest ally (Boeotia) to stick with a weak one (Argos; 3.26-8). And he concludes with a warning (with examples – induction strengthening the argument) that every time Athens has chosen war instead of peace it has suffered disaster (3.30-2). This is the one deliberative speech in the Attic corpus written long before the rise of Macedonia, and we still find it dominated emotionally by attempts to suppress and arouse fear.

Hope and confidence arguments are considerably less frequent than fear ones. For hope, we can postulate that one normally needs to arouse fear before one can give reasons to hope, and indeed it is rare in Attic oratory that we see hope arguments without first seeing fear ones. This is not necessarily the case with confidence, but perhaps Athens's chronic naval and military weaknesses in Demosthenes' politically active period suggests why this emotion appears less frequently (as we shall see, it is far more common in Thucydides).¹⁵

As well as the hope arguments seen in the *First Olynthiac* (1.21-4, as above), the *Second Olynthiac* argues that Philip has treated far too many allies shamefully and this will come back to bite him (2.8-10); if Demosthenes' advice is followed, Philip's alliances will crumble and he will be left isolated, and on its own Macedonia is weak; his subjects will realise they have no share in his glory, but only the sufferings of his constant campaigns (2.13-16). The *First Philippic* refers to Athenians' despair and hopelessness (4.2: οὐκ ἄθυμυτέον ... οὐδ' εἰ πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ), and Demosthenes argues that the rationale for their past despair should become one for future hope (4.2: ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ χεῖριστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει), because: their present situation is only a result of their lack of actions, not attempts that have failed; Philip acquired lots of easily conquerable cities that were formerly friendly to Athens, and should be easily conquerable in return; and Philip (like anyone else) will have allies that hate, fear and envy him (4.2-8). In a couple of later speeches too, Demosthenes repeats some of these arguments, and suggests Athens can hope for victory if it follows his advice (8.46-7; 9.5). Fear and hope arguments occur more widely and more diffusely than this, but these are the main passages that play to them at length.

Turning to the *Third Olynthiac*, we see some other emotions. The speech starts with an analysis of the situation, then the short section previously mentioned that plays to fear (3.8-9), then offered advice. After this opening, sections 15 to 28 – nearly half of the speech – involve arguments that play to civic pride and shame. The section begins with shame: Demosthenes says it is Athenians' duty to fight, but they are shirking it; they will be dishonoured if Philip captures Olynthus; they will have abandoned their land to a barbarian, and deserted on the field of battle (3.16-17). He then starts to interleave with his shaming remarks, claims designed to boost Athenians' pride: he suggests Athenians are prudent and honourable, and will not neglect their duties even for no pay; if they've fought Greek cities, they will not let a barbarian enslave Greeks just because they aren't paid to fight (3.20).

¹⁵ This weakness seems mainly due to the reluctance of Athenians to serve in the navy, and problems with the management of operations by ineffective commanders – see Cawkwell (1984).

He next moves into full eulogy of Athenians gone by – a line of argument familiar from funeral speeches, designed to arouse civic pride and spur contemporaries to live up to the supposed great deeds of their ancestors. Demosthenes compares himself to great statesmen of the past (3.21), thus introducing the topic, and goes on to talk of their ancestors' achievements (3.23-6): they commanded willing obedience from Greeks for decades; they accumulated a vast amount of money; the king of Macedonia was their subject, as is the proper relationship of a barbarian to Greeks; they won many battles by land and sea; and their deeds ensured their great renown for posterity (3.24). At home, they used the city's wealth to build beautiful buildings; they were moderate in their way of life, such that those politically active had no better houses than anyone else and acted disinterestedly for the common good. In short, they showed good faith towards other Greeks, were pious towards the gods, and had equality amongst themselves (3.25-6). And then, by comparing his contemporaries to their ancestors, he reawakens shame: Athenians have been robbed of their own land; they have frittered away vast amounts of money for no gain; they have lost in peacetime the allies gained in wartime; and they have trained a great enemy for themselves through their actions and inactions (3.27-9).¹⁶

As with fear and hope, arguments designed to arouse shame and pride are not confined to this one speech. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes chides the Athenians for spending the entire period of Philip's rise procrastinating, hoping for others to act, blaming each other, putting each other on trial, and hoping some more (2.25). Early in the *First Philippic*, he castigates Athenians for not doing what is needed, and says that the greatest necessity for free men is shame at their current situation (4.10-11). Later in the same speech he devotes a lengthy section to the emotion, saying it is shameful for Athenians to deceive themselves and put off doing disagreeable things, constantly being at the mercy of events rather than shaping them (4.38-9); they spend forever running around to relieve wherever Philip is attacking, rather than taking the war to him (4.40-1); and they are getting a reputation for dishonour and cowardice and all manner of other shameful traits, since instead of punishing Philip, Athenians spend all their time trying to avoid suffering harm from him (4.42-3); this makes their enemies laugh at them (4.45). In *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes mocks all the ineffectual speeches given by this or that politician, while Athenians sit on their hands and give Philip free rein to rampage around Greece (8.34-7); later in the speech he describes Athens as humiliated and a laughing-stock (8.67). In the *Fourth Philippic*, he reproves Athenians for acting indolently (10.20), and says that free men feel shame, and if they don't then perhaps it is because they are already slaves (10.27-30); he later calls them the idlest (10.49), and says they are bewitched by leisure and tranquillity (10.54). And shame arguments are seen outside the Philip speeches too: in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes tells the Athenians they will gain a reputation for being less brave than the Argives, and scared of a foreigner and a woman (15.22-3).

Pride arguments also crop up regularly. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes lists Athens's achievements and supposed previous good conduct, in: standing up to Sparta in defence of justice for all Greeks; repeatedly not taking offered chances for self-aggrandisement; and repeatedly spending their money and risking their lives for others (2.24). The *Second Philippic* contains a long section celebrating the reasons for Philip choosing to ally with Thebes and Argos instead of themselves: Philip prefers ambition and universal domination to peace, quietness and justice – the traits Athens is famed for; Athens is driven by selflessness, justice and a desire to avoid sacrificing other cities for Athens's gain (6.7-9); Philip judged that Athens would not abandon the common justice of Greece and desire for Greece's goodwill for any amount of profit,

¹⁶ The speech continues with a virulent attack on rival politicians – blackening the opponent being more commonly a forensic technique, suggested too by the emotions the passage aims to arouse (anger, hatred, envy); see note 20 below, and further Carey (this volume).

not just by considering their current conduct, but also their conduct at the time Persia invaded and Athens abandoned their whole land rather than become the greatest power in Greece under Persia; also Athens's fleet is superior to others' (6.10-12). In the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes celebrates Athens's history of opposing oppressors and liberating Greece, and takes pride in their ancestral reputation (10.12-14, 73). And in *On Organisation*, he again celebrates Athens's past achievements (13.21-2, 26).

Turning to the *Second Olynthiac*, we have already seen short passages arousing hope (2.8-10, 13-16) and civic pride and shame (2.24-5), but its other emotions are more unusual for deliberative oratory. Near the beginning is a section aiming to arouse indignation or anger against Philip by rehearsing his past crimes: he breaks oaths, is untrustworthy and base; he said he would give Athens Amphipolis, but didn't; he broke an alliance to hand Potidaea over to the Olynthians; he handed over Magnesia to the Thessalians; he habitually pretends friendship with a city, then betrays them to another city to win their friendship in turn; he's shown bad faith to everyone he has had dealings with, which shows his own bad character; he's gained power by greed and villainy, and cannot retain it by crime, perjury and lying (2.5-10).

As in forensic oratory, the listing of someone's crimes and their 'labelling' aim to incite indignation, anger or outrage. Chaniotis has talked about 'acoustic signals',¹⁷ words whose use – especially repeatedly – aims to arouse emotions or impel some other predictable response. In our own culture we might think of politicians or newspapers using words such as 'scrounger', 'benefit cheat', 'rapist', 'paedophile', and in some circles 'immigrant' or 'Tory' – words the user expects to arouse a visceral reaction in a listener or reader. In Athens it is very likely that words such as 'greed', 'villainy', 'crime', 'perjury' and 'lying' aroused strong hostile reactions from an audience. This is a trick borrowed from forensic oratory, and one Demosthenes was very good at.¹⁸ In this speech he is attempting to arouse anger at Philip to get Athenians to punish him. Anger is by far the most common forensic emotion that we see in deliberative speeches. Such an emotional technique is used in several other extended passages in the Demosthenic corpus in relation to Philip,¹⁹ and sometimes too Demosthenes attempts to arouse anger against his fellow politicians, either for being corrupt and venal or for doing Philip's bidding.²⁰

We should be aware that anger is a hierarchical emotion: it is (at least in Greek culture) mainly felt by superiors towards inferiors, people they can punish.²¹ To bolster Demosthenes' argument in the *Second Olynthiac* that Athenians should see Philip as an inferior (2.5), it is perhaps not surprising that contempt is also played with, uniquely in this one same speech in the deliberative corpus.²² Philip's soldiers are described as no better than any others, and indeed worse because the best are weeded out; Philip himself is labelled worthless, is depicted as jealous of anyone around him of any worth, and a leader of drunk and licentious toadies that consist partly of all the most degraded and un-martial people driven out of Athens (2.17-21). Contempt – like indignation – is also felt by superiors towards inferiors, and in this sense they are

¹⁷ Chaniotis (2009) 200.

¹⁸ On hostile emotions in Attic forensic oratory, see Sanders (2012). Kremmydas (2013) 61-2 notes that Demosthenes (and others) could attribute mildly derogatory character traits to the *dēmos* to show how someone had manipulated and deceived them, and he postulates this would arouse their anger; one of these traits is *euêtheia* (naivety), which Demosthenes refers to here (2.6: τὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν εὐήθειαν).

¹⁹ Dem. 4.49-50; 9.26-35; [Dem.] 7.32-44.

²⁰ Dem. 3.29-32; 6.30-4; 8.64-6; 9.53; 10.58-9, 62-3, 75. Anger is probably not the only hostile emotion that comes into play here – hatred is a possible adjunct to anger in all these passages, and in Sanders (2014) 97-8 I argue that envy is relevant to Dem. 3.29-32. See also Carey (this volume).

²¹ See Konstan (2006) 61-65 on Hecuba's (Eur. *Hec.*) different reactions to the deaths of Polyxena and Polydorus: she reluctantly accepts the first out of necessity, but revenges the second because she has the power to do so.

²² In Thucydides' deliberative speeches, contempt is seen more often, paired regularly with confidence.

functionally distinct from – indeed opposed to – fear, which is felt by inferiors towards superiors.²³ It should not surprise us either, then, that this is one of the few deliberative speeches in which fear arguments do not appear at all.

We have seen that the range of emotions appealed to in surviving deliberative speeches in the Attic corpus is – largely as expected – fear, hope and confidence, civic pride and shame, as well as contempt (which involves a lack of fear and high level of confidence), with anger the main forensic emotion seen. However, the range of speeches we have is very limited, coming as they almost entirely do from one 25-year period, and mostly from the pen of one man.²⁴

Thucydides' deliberative speeches at Athens

To test these findings, I compare them to the results of a second, distinct corpus: deliberative speeches reported in historiography. Herodotus and Xenophon are prone to giving speeches in *précis*, and frequently in indirect speech, which does not allow much space for emotional arguments to be developed. Thucydides, however, gives a significant number of orations at length, and in direct speech.²⁵ While there are legitimate questions as to how reliably he presents speeches,²⁶ my main concern is not so much with whether the arguments used in any particular speech are historically accurate, but rather with the types of arguments used in his deliberative speeches as a whole. They would have needed to sound plausible to contemporary readers, and therefore we should expect similar sorts of emotional arguments in Thucydides' speeches, taken as a whole, to those his readers would have heard in their own assemblies. In this light, it is notable that his deliberative speeches use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Attic corpus, and I use some of the speeches to the Athenian assembly for illustration.²⁷

Before the Peloponnesian War begins, Corcyran envoys plead for military aid from Athens against Corinth, and Corinthian envoys beg Athens not to provide it. Both sides recognise they are asking Athens to judge a quarrel, and so there is a forensic element to this decision which will require arousal of appropriate emotions. The Corcyrans admit that they cannot call on friendship and gratitude for past services, since they have not rendered any (1.32.1); they do attempt to arouse pity at the fate that awaits them if Corinth and its allies conquers them (32.5), and mention their great danger (33.1 and 35.3-4); and they arouse indignation at a Spartan unfairness that allows Corinth allies but not Corcyra (35.3).

²³ Konstan (2006) 132, discussing Aristotle's list of people we fear (*Rh.* 2.5, 1382a33-1382b18).

²⁴ Though, as mentioned earlier, the presence of some speeches by writers other than Demosthenes boosts confidence in these conclusions.

²⁵ Deliberative speeches reported at length are: Thuc. 1.32-6, 1.37-43, 1.68-71, 1.73-8, 1.80-5, 1.86, 1.120-4, 1.140-4, 2.13 (in indirect speech), 2.60-4, 2.71, 3.9-14, 3.37-40, 3.42-8, 3.53-9, 3.61-7, 4.17-20, 4.59-64, 4.85-7, 4.98 (in indirect speech), 5.85-111 (in dialogue form), 6.9-14, 6.16-18, 6.20-3, 6.33-4, 6.36-40, 6.72 (in indirect speech), 6.76-80, 6.82-7, 6.89-92, 7.11-15 (in letter form). For a comprehensive list of speeches in Thucydides see West (1973).

²⁶ Scholars are quite reasonably troubled by the following statement at Thuc. 1.22.1: 'I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν] for by each situation'; tr. Warner (1954) 47.

²⁷ Concentrating here on speeches at Athens provides the nearest comparison to the Attic corpus, and removes other potential variables that might arise from differing *polis* outlooks or value systems. Thucydidean speeches to other cities' assemblies (notably Sparta's) do in fact use the same emotions, albeit weighted somewhat differently – as I discuss in my as-yet-unpublished papers 'Different strokes for different folks' (delivered at the European Social Science History Conference, 12th April 2012) and 'Thucydides and emotional incitement to war' (delivered at the Classical Association conference, 14th April 2014), both available on request.

However, these forensic-style arguments are presented only briefly. The Corcyrans swiftly move on to draw attention to their naval skill, playing on Athens' desire for gratitude from – or simply desire for – a client with a strong navy, which they will acquire painlessly and which will boost their military strength (32.5, 33.1-2, 35.5, 36.1). The Corcyrans also play on fears of future wars – Sparta wants war with Athens, and so does Corinth, which attacked Corcyra first to neutralise its large navy (33.3); they should look at how the Corinthians are treating Corcyra, and not trust them (34.3); rejecting Corcyra will leave them weaker (36.1), and if Corinth conquers Corcyra their combined navy will rival Athens's, so Athens should beware of allowing this (36.3). As well as arousing fear of the consequences if their advice is not taken, they allay any fears of Spartan reprisals if it is (35.1, 36.1). Finally, they cement their advantage by dangling before Athens secure routes to Italy and Sicily (36.2) – another desire argument. In this speech fear is one of two emotions primarily played to, and the other is desire. The latter is an emotion we do not see significantly in Demosthenes, whose prominence came at a period when Athens was mainly on the defensive; but it is clearly an element of Thucydides' thesis that one of the causes of the war was Athenian rapacity, and we find this emotion played to several times in speeches at Athens.

The Corinthian envoys, responding to the Corcyran speech, misjudge the Athenians and the context of the speech. They overestimate Athens's willingness to judge impartially and ignore its own benefit, so spend nearly half the speech trying to arouse indignation at Corcyran crimes (1.37.1-40.1), and another quarter playing on gratitude and friendship for their own support for Athens in the past (41.1-42.1, 43.1-2). When they eventually turn to arguments that will arouse deliberative emotions – again desire and fear – they continue to get it wrong. In discussing Corcyra's crimes, they manage to reinforce Corcyra's own arguments about the desirability of the alliance, mentioning its strategic position, wealth and huge navy (37.3, 38.5, 42.4). On the fear side, they threaten Athens with war (40.2-3, 42.2) and the dangers of encouraging subordinate allies to revolt (40.4-6) – but Corinth should be well aware that Athens is unlikely to be swayed by fear arguments alone, as they later instruct the Spartans about the Athenians' hopeful, optimistic outlook (1.70),²⁸ and indeed Athens votes for the Corcyran alliance.

After Sparta declares war, the Athenians hold an assembly to discuss how to respond. Some argue for peace; however, the decisive speech is given by the politician Pericles. He starts by ramping up anger and indignation at Sparta's plotting, and preferring immediate war to arbitration (1.140.2). He then plays on the Athenians' pride at wanting to show themselves able to hold what they have without Spartan interference, and the shame they would feel at giving in to them and so appearing fearful and slavish (140.5-141.1). This decreases the likelihood of his audience giving Spartan arguments a fair hearing, and ensures a receptive ear for what follows. He next – at great length – suppresses any fears of losing to Sparta, arguing that the Spartans are not suited to a long campaign nor one overseas due to having few money reserves (141.2-142.1), and explains how Athens can counter any threat (142.2-143.2). This suppression of fear of the enemy is a good lead-in to what follows: arousal of confidence in Athens's own naval abilities (142.3-5, 143.1, 143.3-5), as well as contempt for their opponents' aversion to risk and lack of skill (142.7-8). Finally, following a statement that the Athenians have many other grounds for hope for a good outcome (144.1: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι), he plays on pride at their ancestors' achievements and desires for similar honour (144.3-4).

²⁸ If someone is of a very optimistic disposition, it is necessary to show them why any particular hopes are unrealistic before they will be receptive to fear arguments. Similarly when someone is in despair, you must give them back some hope before they will be amenable to confidence arguments – see below.

A year into the War, Athens' hinterland had been invaded and devastated twice, and a plague had hit the overcrowded city, killing large numbers. These enormous sufferings had brought a mood of despair (2.59.2: ἄποροι) and desire for peace. Pericles speaks to dissuade them.²⁹ He first attempts to suppress despair, by arguing that the plague is a one-off disaster while all the other problems were expected (61.2-62.1), so as to create receptiveness for what follows. He next argues at length for confidence in eventual victory (62.1-3), as before coupling this with contempt for their opponents (62.3-4). And eventually, having restored their optimism, he raises the spectre of what their subject states might do should they be freed (63.1-2) – a fear argument. Concurrently, we find arguments designed to arouse shame at their irresolution (61.2) and falling below the standards of their fathers and losing what they already possess (62.3), and pride in being citizens of a great city whose past achievements and current glory they must live up to (61.4, 63.1, 64.2-3).

Though Cleon treats his speech after the Mytilenian revolt in 427 as forensic, calling for *orgê* (see above) at their *hubris* and arguing for *timôria* (punishment), Diodotus's response is instructive. He explicitly draws a contrast between the lawcourt and the Assembly (3.44.4: ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν), saying anger is unhelpful and inappropriate in deciding what to do in an Assembly: they must think of the future rather than the present (3.44.3: περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλευέσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος), and how best to deter other cities from revolting.³⁰ Raising this spectre constitutes a fear argument, and he continues to play on fear by discussing at length the problems with putting down future revolts if the precedent set is capital punishment for every citizen, not guilty as well as guilty (3.45-6).

In 425, after the capture of Pylos, Spartan envoys came to Athens to sue for peace. They first attempt to dampen the Athenians' hopes for the future by arguing that the current Athenian military position is only due to good luck, which might change (4.17.4-18.3). Once that hope (as they believe) has been dampened, they attempt to arouse fears that something will happen to cause unending enmity from Sparta, such that they will permanently lose the chance for peace (20.1).

Ten years later, the Athenians debate an expedition to capture Sicily. At the assembly meeting, two prominent politicians make speeches: Nicias, who is against the expedition; and Alcibiades, who is in favour. Nicias tries to dissuade them by arousing fear of renewed warfare with Sparta if Athens divides and weakens its forces (6.10.2-4), of Sicily joining in on Sparta's side (11.4-6), and of their being led astray by Alcibiades (12.2); and he tries to suppress what he calls their '*duserôs*', their 'sick desire' (13.1).³¹ Alcibiades responds by suppressing fear of his youthful counsel and of Sicilian military power (17.1-3, 5-6), and arousing their contempt for the divided and disorganised Sicilians and confidence in an easy victory (17.3-4). He ends with dire warnings of how Athens has grown so large it must keep growing or be conquered in turn (18.3), and that Athens will atrophy if it does not quickly throw itself back into war (18.6).

We have found that the speeches Thucydides puts into the mouths of those addressing the Athenian Assembly use a similar palette of emotions to those in the Demosthenic corpus 75 years later. This is not distinct to speeches addressed to Athenians. In an appendix to this chapter, I give a rough and ready summary of the emotions played to in all deliberative speeches in

²⁹ cf. the start of the *First Philippic*.

³⁰ See further Harris (2013) 104-5.

³¹ Thucydides, commenting in his own voice, also describes the Athenians as feeling *epithumia* (appetite – often used in a sexual sense) and *erôs* for the expedition (6.24.2-3): they are so 'turned on' at the thought of acquiring Sicily, that their reason is completely overruled.

Thucydides.³² From this summary it can be seen that what I call the ‘deliberative emotions’ – fear, hope (and suppression of despair), confidence (and its adjunct contempt), desire, shame and pride – are the primary group of emotions aroused in deliberative oratory in order to persuade assemblies.

However, unlike in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches, where anger is the only forensic emotion that figures prominently, Thucydides’ deliberative speeches use five of the forensic emotions – anger, hatred, pity, gratitude and friendship – on a regular basis, if as a group less so than the deliberative emotions. This suggests that judging other cities is an important part of deliberation. However, Thucydides’ regular inclusion of forensic emotions is more nuanced than it appears on the surface. First, the majority of his speeches are delivered to Athens or Sparta (the two strongest cities), and it is notable that the speeches delivered to other cities – cities without the power to sit in judgment – are generally more heavily biased towards the ‘deliberative’ emotions. It is also apparent that arguments designed to arouse friendship, hatred and gratitude are primarily made by visiting envoys (for obvious reasons), rather than by citizens of the addressed polis. This explains why these three emotions are far more common in speeches reported in historiography than in the Attic corpus, where all deliberative speeches are made by citizens.

We can further note that arguments appealing to forensic emotions are clustered heavily in a few speeches, notably: a) the Corinthian and Athenian speeches to Sparta (1.68-71, 1.73-8), and b) Cleon’s and Diodotus’s speeches after the Mytilenian revolt (3.37-40, 3.42-8), both pairs of which have strong elements of a trial about them; c) the Plataean and Theban speeches to Spartan generals (3.53-9, 3.61-7), which are forensic in all but name; and d) Alcibiades’ speech to Spartans (6.89-92), where he has to dispel high levels of hostility towards him personally before he can persuade them on policy. Outside these speeches, the proportion of arguments appealing to forensic emotions again falls drastically.

Finally, the disparity between these two sets of emotions, and particularly the predominance of fear arguments, is most apparent if one looks in detail at the longer speeches (which the table in my appendix does not do). For example, Pericles’ speech at 2.60-4 suppresses anger and rouses goodwill in chapter 60 only, while deliberative emotions are aroused in all four of the following chapters. In Hermocrates’ appeal to the Sicilians at 4.59-64, fear and hope figure in all six chapters, though this only gives one X each in the table. Nicias’s speech discussed earlier has fear arguments in five chapters, but hope and suppression of desire only in one. And when Hermocrates addresses the Camarinaeans, fear arguments again appear in all five chapters, while pity, pride, shame and hope appear only in one each. Taking these various factors into account, it should be clear that the emotions I have for convenience labelled ‘deliberative’ – and particularly fear – do indeed predominate in Thucydides’ deliberative speeches.

Conclusion

The evidence from both the Attic corpus and Thucydidean deliberative speeches shows that we can confidently posit fear (in particular), hope, confidence, contempt, shame, pride, and (in Thucydides at least) desire as the primary deliberative emotions – i.e. the emotions most important for an orator to arouse in an assembly, when trying to persuade them towards a particular course of action. This is not to say that forensic emotions such as anger, pity or gratitude do not have a place; but when they do, it is generally in situations where the deliberation has a quasi-forensic aspect to it, i.e. when the deliberating city is in a position to

³² And some quasi-deliberative ones – e.g. where an army in the field has to make the decision, the army functions as a miniature assembly on the move.

judge and either reward or punish the city about which it is deliberating. This is more obvious in Thucydides than the Attic corpus, which is not surprising given Athens's relative weakness (i.e. inability to punish) in the mid-fourth century compared with the late fifth.

I have postulated that the emotions that principally relate to deliberative oratory do so because they are primarily concerned with the future, and this is the time period most relevant to political deliberation. This is based partly on evidence pieced together from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and partly because this deduction seems to accord with common sense. Thucydides provides corroborating evidence in Diodotus's speech, where he explicitly chastises Cleon for arousing anger and talking about punishment, on the grounds that this is not a lawcourt (where such arguments would be appropriate) but an Assembly, where they need to consider what is best for the future; he continues by playing on fear – which I have shown is the most common deliberative emotion in Thucydides, Andocides 3 and the Demosthenic corpus's deliberative speeches – rather than using forensic emotions (e.g. suppressing anger or arousing pity), which might at first appear the more logical response to Cleon's arguments.

Finally, focusing (in the Attic corpus) primarily on the three *Olynthiacs* has shown that, even for three speeches delivered by the same person in similar circumstances only weeks apart, a range of very different emotional arguments are possible. The *First* uses primarily fear and confidence/hope; the *Third* primarily civic pride and shame; while the *Second*, as well as hope and pride, plays with indignation and (uniquely in the Attic corpus) contempt. This suggests that speakers would have had a wide range of emotional arguments they could choose from – albeit primarily from the deliberative emotions listed above – and situations did not necessarily demand one specific emotional response.

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Appendix: Emotions aroused (or suppressed) in Thucydides' deliberative speeches

Ref.	Speaker	Addressee(s)	Fear	Hope	Confidence	Contempt	Desire/Greed	Despair	Shame	Pride/Desire for honour	Suspicion	Hatred/Hostility	Anger/Indignation	Envy/Jealousy	Pity	Gratitude	Friendship/Goodwill	Emulation	Respect	Grief
1.32-36	Corcyran envoys	Athenian Assembly	X				X			X			X		X	X	X			
1.37-43	Corinthian envoys	Athenian Assembly	X				X		X				X			X				
1.53	Corinthian envoys	Athenian army							X											
1.53	Athenian army	Corinthian envoys	X																	
1.68-71	Corinthian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X						X	X			X	X	X		X			
1.73-78	Athenian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X						X			X	X	X	X		X			
1.80-85	Archidamas	Spartan Assembly	X	X					X	X										
1.86	Sthenelaidas	Spartan Assembly	X						X	X			X							
1.90	Spartan envoys	Athenian Assembly																		
1.90	Themistocles	Athenian Assembly																		
1.91	Themistocles	Spartan Assembly	X																	
1.120-124	Corinthian envoys	Spartan Assembly	X		X															
1.140-144	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X		X	X			X	X			X							
2.13	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X		X							X								
2.60-64	Pericles	Athenian Assembly	X	X	X			X	X	X			X				X			X
2.73	Plataians	Plataians		X															X	
3.9-14	Mytilenian envoys	Peloponnesian Assembly					X					X			X		X		X	
3.30	Teutiaplus of Elis	Peloponnesian generals	X																	
3.37-40	Cleon	Athenian Assembly	X						X			X	X	X	X					
3.42-48	Diodotus	Athenian Assembly	X						X				X	X	X					
3.52	Spartan envoys	Plataian Assembly																		
3.53-59	Plataian envoys	Spartan generals	X						X			X	X		X	X				
3.61-67	Theban envoys	Spartan generals										X	X		X	X	X			
3.71	Corcyran oligarchs	Corcyran Assembly																		
4.17-20	Spartan envoys	Athenian Assembly	X	X	X					X		X					X			
4.21	Cleon	Athenian Assembly			X		X													
4.22	Cleon	Athenian Assembly											X							
4.27	Cleon	Athenian Assembly											X							
4.59-64	Hermocrates	Sicilian assembly	X	X																
4.85-87	Brasidas	Acanthian Assembly	X	X	X							X				X	X			
4.97	Boiotian envoy	Athenian army	X																	
4.98	Athenian envoy	Boiotian army																		
4.120	Brasidas	Scionian Assembly			X												X			
5.85-111	Athenian envoys	Melian Assembly	X	X	X				X											
6.9-14	Nicias	Athenian Assembly	X	X			X													
6.16-18	Alcibiades	Athenian Assembly	X		X	X	X							X		X		X		
6.20-23	Nicias	Athenian Assembly			X															
6.33-34	Hermocrates	Syracusan Assembly	X		X	X														
6.36-40	Athenagoras	Syracusan Assembly	X		X							X				X				
6.72	Hermocrates	Syracusan Assembly			X			X												
6.76-80	Hermocrates	Camarinaean Assembly	X	X				X	X	X				X	X		X			
6.82-87	Athenian envoy	Camarinaean Assembly	X		X						X	X					X			
6.89-92	Alcibiades	Spartan Assembly	X	X	X						X	X	X				X			
7.11-15	Nicias	Athenian Assembly	X										X		X	X				
29	10	16	3	6	3	13	8	2	11	15	6	10	8	12	1	2	1			